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The 1960s and 1970s were decades of tremendous expansion in international banking 
and financial activity through the expansion of international networks, particularly by 
US banks, and by product innovations designed to cope with exchange rate and 
interest rate instability and to evade regulation.  While London continued to 
dominate as the major international financial centre with New York closely behind, 
other IFCs emerged or re-emerged in this new and challenging environment.  These 
developments posed significant challenges for regulators who sought on the one hand 
to promote financial activity, but on the other hand hoped to limit the exposure of 
their banking systems to the instability of the international monetary and financial 
system. Many established economies like France, the USA, Japan and Australia sided 
with protection and curbed the penetration of foreign banks while a few others, such 
as the UK and centres in the Caribbean, welcomed the increased business they 
provided.1  In the case of London regulators promoted offshore business while 
retaining exchange controls on residents. This paper explores how the regulators of 
one emerging IFC coped with these challenges and moved from being captured by 
incumbent firms to adopting a more independent and liberal approach while still 
protecting the local retail market.  The attitudes of the state and the incumbents 
conformed to the divergent views in the current economics literature on the impact of 
foreign bank penetration.  The state hoped to gain the advantages described by 
Levine in terms of improved efficiency, management skills and technology through 
controlling market entry, while incumbents feared the outcome described by 
Claessens et. al. of falling profits and margins from increased competition.2  The 
case of Hong Kong is further of interest because of its huge success in exploiting its 
advantages of language, law and location to establish the most prominent IFC in Asia 
during this period despite continued controls on foreign banks.  While it seemed 
reasonable for large European economies to protect their incumbents from foreign 
competition, the options were more finely balanced for the Hong Kong government 
faced with a small open economy more dependent on international financial activity. 
     By the 1970s, Hong Kong had emerged as a major regional and global 
international financial centre, particularly because of its strong representation in 
 1
global banking. This reflected the rise of East Asian economic growth, restrictions 
elsewhere in the region on international banking (particularly Tokyo) and open 
exchange and trade markets.  In the historiography of these developments, the IFC in 
Hong Kong is usually described as developing organically from the historical entrepot 
activities of the colony and commercial relations with China and then the wider East 
Asian region.3 The rise of Hong Kong as an international financial centre is usually 
attributed to the lack of government interference that provided a safe haven for 
regional capital. Henry Smith famously dubbed the colony ‘John Stuart Mill’s Other 
Island’ in recognition of the free markets that prevailed there.4  Milton Friedman 
consistently praised the laissez-faire economic policies of Hong Kong’s Financial 
Secretary Sir John Cowperthwaite during the 1960s. Among Friedman’s final 
publications was a contribution to the Wall Street Journal where he described Hong 
Kong as ‘a shining symbol of economic freedom’.5 In 1998, Friedman specifically 
attributed the relatively poor economic growth of Britain compared to Hong Kong to 
‘socialism in Britain, free enterprise and free markets in Hong Kong.’6 This 
characterisation is certainly true for international capital flows and the foreign 
exchange market, which operated more freely than almost any other centre in the 
world in the 1950s.7  The low tax structure attracted business and capital to the 
colony and reflected the official policy of ‘positive non-interventionism’ at a time 
when most governments, particularly the imperial metropole Britain, were highly 
interventionist. In this context, the rise of Hong Kong as an IFC is generally regarded 
as uncontested.  Nevertheless regulations on entry into the banking system from 
1965 and a cartel for deposit interest rates from 1964 until 2001 constrained free 
competition. The banking sector, a core element in the development of the economy 
and the international financial centre, was certainly not a free market during the 
glorious ‘half-century of positive non-interventionism’ described by Friedman. Indeed, 
Hong Kong arguably developed as a major regional financial centre in the 1960s and 
1970s despite of rather than because of the regulatory framework that operated in the 
colony.  
     In 1964, in response to a supposed ‘interest rate war’ the Exchange Banks 
Association (the precursor to the Hong Kong Association of Banks) negotiated an 
Interest Rate Agreement that applied to all banks operating in the colony to restrict 
price competition for deposits.  Interest rate cartels were not unusual in the 1960s; 
similar arrangements existed in both the USA and the UK. However, these countries 
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abandoned interest rate controls in the 1970s, while Hong Kong maintained their 
Interest Rate Rules in amended form until 2001.  Secondly and more unusually, in 
May 1965, after two waves of banking crisis in February and April of that year, the 
government imposed a moratorium on all new bank licenses (foreign and domestic) to 
contain what was viewed as excessive competition.8 Once the moratorium was lifted 
in 1978 it continued to discriminate against foreign banks by limiting them to one 
office to contain competition in the local retail market.  The Hong Kong government 
finally lifted barriers to entry of foreign banks in 2001.  
     The official rationale for the moratorium on new bank licenses in 1965 was to 
enhance stability by encouraging consolidation in the banking sector.  Forty years 
later, the relationship between stability of banking systems and concentration is still 
the subject of debate.9  On the one hand a comparison between the historically 
unstable US system, with a proliferation of small banks, and the relatively stable 
systems of Canada and Europe, where a few large banks dominate, suggests that ‘big 
is beautiful’.  Large banks might be better able to diversify risk, and a less 
competitive environment might make banks less prone to engage in risky behaviour.  
Allen and Gale have also argued that it is easier for a government to supervise and 
enforce prudential supervision in a system with a small number of banks.10  On the 
other hand, the dominance of a few large banks might lead to a situation where they 
become ‘too big to fail’ and thus induce moral hazard.  Large banks may also have 
complex and opaque operations that make supervision more challenging.  
International evidence has also suggested that systems where small banks have greater 
market share have more lending to SMEs.11
     Recent empirical research suggests that barriers to entry by foreign banks do 
not enhance financial stability.12 Removing such barriers may increase the quality of 
the banking system through the import of managerial and technological efficiencies.  
Where banks are subject to sound regulatory and supervisory jurisdictions at home 
this may also transfer to the host centre, so prudential supervision might be imported. 
On the other hand, foreign banks may face more information obstacles when lending 
to local SMEs, an issue that could have had particular relevance for Hong Kong, 
where SMEs dominated the manufacturing sector.13  In a study of 80 developed and 
developing economies, Claessens et al found that increased foreign penetration 
reduces profits and margins for domestic banks particularly in developing economies, 
thus improving efficiency through competition, but challenging incumbent interests.14
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     This paper investigates the operation and impact of the moratorium on new 
banking licences: first by examining foreign banks’ attempts to circumvent the 
moratorium through claims of special circumstances and buying interests in local 
banks, and secondly by examining the efforts of incumbents to extend barriers to 
non-bank financial institutions and to branches of foreign banks.  The general 
conclusions are that while the moratorium was aimed at increasing the stability of the 
banking system, it had the effect of decreasing the regulatory breadth of the 
government, and reducing incentives for mergers and acquisitions that might have 
improved governance.  Widespread evidence of fraud immediately after the 
moratorium ended show that it was not an effective cure for the governance problems 
of the Hong Kong banking system.  The experience suggests that barriers to entry 
alone are not a substitute for effective prudential supervision nor an effective way to 
import good practice.  The analysis also emphasizes the conflict between the 
government’s support of the development of the IFC in Hong Kong and local banking 
interests, and how this was resolved through the regulatory system.  Particularly 
evident is the high level of hostility even among the largest banks in Hong Kong to 
the entry of new foreign competition.  By convincing the government that 
competition was dangerous for depositors, existing banks were able to maintain high 
barriers to entry for foreign banks and eventually to negotiate restrictions on the 
activities of non-bank financial institutions as well.  Their main successes, however, 
were limited to the protection of the retail market because of the state’s support of the 
international financial centre.  The evidence provides greater detail to underpin the 
conclusions of Goodstadt and Greenwood that the regulatory framework for Hong 
Kong banking in the 1970s was inadequate and positively damaging to the stability of 
the system.15
 
I  The Banking System in the 1960s 
There was no central bank in Hong Kong so the duties of note issue, prudential 
supervision, regulation and lending of last resort were shared between the government 
and commercial banks. Currency notes were issued by the HSBC, Chartered Bank and 
the Mercantile Bank under an effective currency board system operated through the 
government’s Exchange Fund. There were no restrictions on international capital 
flows and so no distinction between off-shore and on-shore business. Offshore 
earnings were subject to a withholding tax that prevented the operation of the 
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Asia-dollar market in Hong Kong, a privilege that went to Singapore.  A Banking 
Advisory Committee (made up of the Financial Secretary, the Accountant General, 
bank representatives and an accountant) advised the government on issues related to 
the banking industry.  The Exchange Banks Association, led by the HSBC, set the 
interest rates payable on deposits under the Interest Rate Agreement.  The regulatory 
system was underdeveloped until 1965 when a more robust Banking Ordinance was 
introduced including monitoring of balance sheets and limits on insider lending.16  
Institutions intending to accept deposits ‘from the general public’ could apply for a 
license to call themselves banks so long as they met minimum requirements of paid 
up capital.  Disappointed applicants could appeal to the Governor but not the courts.  
A Banking Commissioner (Leo Cole until 1971, then JC Paterson) was appointed 
under the Ordinance, but his budget was small and his powers constrained by the 
Financial Secretary (Sir JJ Cowperthwaite until 1971, then Sir Philip Haddon-Cave).  
The change in the personalities of Financial Secretary and Banking Commissioner in 
1971 prompted a shift in the attitude to the moratorium and we can mark its erosion 
from this date.  Weaknesses in prudential supervision and enforcement continued, 
however, and contributed to the persistence of poor governance structures among 
many Hong Kong banks into the 1980s. 
 
While poor governance in Asia was not unusual in the 1960s, since banks were often 
tied to business groups or the government, Hong Kong was distinctive because it was 
already emerging as an important regional and global financial centre.  The number 
of banks increased sharply from the late 1950s due to increased domestic demand 
from the large immigrant population, growing industry in the colony, and also flight 
of capital to Hong Kong from elsewhere in Asia due to political and economic 
uncertainty in the region.  This changing environment prompted two waves of local 
banking crisis: in 1961 and in 1965.  The causes of the banking crises are beyond the 
scope of this paper but they are well covered in existing literature.17  In summary, the 
diagnosis was that excessive competition was encouraging risky behaviour, that Hong 
Kong was ‘over banked’ and that the appropriate response was to restrict new entry to 
the market. 
 
This diagnosis created a tension between the banks (who lobbied for even more 
anti-competitive regulation) and the state which, while agreeing that there were too 
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many banks, hoped to promote Hong Kong as an international financial centre.  This 
conflict was expressed in the debate over a further moratorium on bank branches in 
the late 1960s and in the regulation of the non-bank deposit-taking companies that 
emerged in the international financial boom of the 1970s.  Until the moratorium in 
1965 there were few non-bank financial companies engaged in international business, 
but by the early 1970s their numbers had increased to several hundred. 
 
 
Outline Chronology 
Interest Rate Agreement 1964 
Moratorium on new bank licences 1965 
Lobbying for Limits on new bank branches 1966-69 
Barclays Bank seeks licence 1971-1972 
Amendment of Moratorium to exclude banks from countries not yet 
represented in Hong Kong 
1972 
Banks lobby for regulation of DTCs 1973-5 
3-tier banking system proposed 1974 
Regulation of DTCs introduced 1975 
Moratorium on new bank licences lifted July 1978 
Moratorium on new bank licences re-imposed August 1978 
Moratorium on new bank licences lifted: one office only allowed 1981 
New foreign banks restricted to 3 offices 1999 
Restriction on number of offices lifted 2001 
 
 
II Operation of the Moratorium as a Barrier for Foreign Banks 
During the early 1970s there were several applications for new licenses made on 
special grounds, but only one was successful. Barclays Bank first applied for a license 
in August 1969 but was advised to find a local bank to acquire as a form of entry.  In 
November 1971 they applied for a license in their own name and received the support 
of the Banking Commissioner.18  He made the case to the Banking Advisory 
Committee (BAC) that no British banks (as opposed to British Overseas banks) had 
branches in Hong Kong, which was regrettable because of Hong Kong’s trade 
relations with the UK. The added prestige to Hong Kong’s IFC of hosting one of the 
‘Big Four’ British banks was also a factor. Finally, Paterson expressed his belief that 
UK-incorporated banks were never meant to have been considered ‘foreign’ under the 
moratorium. A pencilled minute on the HSBC’s copy of this document notes ‘these 
are not in my view sound arguments. No’. 
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 At the same time as the Barclays case was put to the BAC, Paterson also 
recommended that a Swiss bank be allowed to enter the market.  This has never 
before been noted in the historical account of the moratorium. Given the global 
importance of the Swiss banking industry, the presence of a Swiss bank would 
‘contribute significantly to the Colony’s prestige’.  Moreover, HSBC was trying to 
open a branch in Switzerland and had been told that reciprocity in Hong Kong would 
help their application.19
 
The two cases were discussed at the BAC meeting in December 1971. All were agreed 
that if the Swiss bank put in a formal application then it should be granted on the 
grounds of promoting the IFC in Hong Kong.  In the end, however, a formal 
application was delayed and the Swiss bank did not enter until after the moratorium 
was lifted.  The case of Barclays was much more controversial. Members were 
concerned about the threat of competition, and the danger of other large British banks 
considering this a precedent for their own cases. On the other hand, the members of 
the BAC were generally agreed about the prestige benefits.  Sandberg of HSBC 
raised the danger that, if refused, Barclays would go to Singapore instead of Hong 
Kong, an outcome the Financial Secretary, Haddon-Cave, described as ‘most 
embarrassing and politically unfortunate’, although the other banks were not so 
concerned.20  After considerable discussion both proposals were approved subject to 
the proviso suggested by Sandberg that Barclays should make one more attempt to 
buy a local bank. This delayed the final decision for a further few months. 
 
In early February 1972, a team from Barclays visited Hong Kong and convinced 
Paterson that they had done all they could to take over a local bank, so they should be 
granted a license in their own name.  The BAC meeting in April 1972 to consider 
this second request was more reluctant, with most members arguing that Barclays 
should be required to make yet a further attempt at acquisition. After much grumbling 
the meeting agreed to recommend that a license be granted but that Barclays be 
restricted to one office only. Any branch expansion would require Barclays to take 
over a local bank.21  At the last minute, Sandberg of HSBC and Millar of Chartered 
Bank tried to reverse this decision because there was another foreign bank in 
take-over negotiations with a local bank, suggesting that this might still be an option 
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for Barclays. They were knocked back since the papers were already with the 
Executive Council who would be meeting in 4 days’ time.22  In the end, it took three 
more months for the Executive Council to approve Barclays’ application and the 
office was finally opened on 3 April 1973. Barclays was restricted to operating one 
branch only and claimed that it intended to focus on the wholesale market, thus 
fulfilling the government’s goal of developing the international financial centre 
without increasing competition in the local retail market.23
 
The Barclays case did mark a change in the attitude of the government to try to 
resolve the contradiction between wanting to support the development of the 
international financial centre in Hong Kong, but not wanting any further competition 
in the domestic market. They announced a limitation of the moratorium to allow 
consideration of banks from countries or regions that were not yet represented in 
Hong Kong.  This encouraged more applications but did not result in any new 
licenses, effectively achieving the goal of showing willingness to support the IFC 
while not allowing further competition.  In July 1973 applications from five banks 
were put to the BAC, and all but one were rejected. The exception was the Swiss bank 
discussed earlier and approval was agreed so long as HSBC was allowed to enter 
Zurich. The banks (and grounds for refusal) were BCCI (too young), Bank Bumiputra 
Malaysia Berhad (there was already an established Malaysian bank in Hong Kong), 
and Habib Bank (already turned down in 1969; State Bank of Pakistan would object). 
The Bank of Tokyo wanted to transfer its license to a new wholly owned locally 
incorporated bank in order to increase their appeal to other Hong Kong banks and 
customers.  This proposal was rejected because it would set a precedent for other 
banks to do the same. In October 1973 Continental Bank applied, and in February 
1974 First National Bank of Chicago applied.  They were rejected on the grounds 
that there were already several US banks in Hong Kong, and the Continental Bank 
had a wholly owned subsidiary finance company in Hong Kong (Continental Bank 
Illinois (HK) Ltd.) ‘whose activities are at present unrestricted by law and which can 
and does, carry on a very extensive banking business outside the scope of the Banking 
Ordinance’.24   
 
In March 1974, Haddon-Cave mentioned in his budget speech that he was reassessing 
the moratorium, prompting a rush of new interest. In June 1974, six applications were 
 8
put to the BAC of which three were deemed to meet the new criteria, but all were held 
up until a coherent policy on new licenses could be established, which in the end took 
a further four years.25 One bank was allowed to enter under the name of an existing 
bank.26
 
When the moratorium was finally lifted in July 1978 there was an immediate rush of 
applications and within a year 25 new licenses had been approved.  On 7 August, 
after 41 applications had been made, the government announced that it would not be 
accepting further applications for a period of at least 6 months to allow an evaluation 
of the impact of new banks on the banking system. In the end six months turned into 
two years, and the suspension was only lifted in 1981.  Even then, however, the rules 
followed the precedent set by Barclays Bank and new foreign banks were restricted to 
one office to prevent them competing with existing banks in the domestic market for 
deposits.  This was amended to three offices in 1999 and finally abandoned in 2001. 
 
The archival evidence presented here shows that without the moratorium there would 
have been more foreign banks in Hong Kong and that most of them would probably 
have come from the USA since most of the frustrated applications were from US 
banks.  The late 1960s was a time of dramatic expansion in US banks’ multinational 
presence due partly to restrictions at home. For example, from 1965-71 twenty-seven 
US banks opened offices in London’s IFC. The pent up demand for bank licenses 
shows that there was still belief in the scope for profit in the market from full banking 
activity that could not be met through finance company subsidiaries. The alternative 
of opening a finance company had the advantage of not being subject to the banking 
ordinance, but it could not trade on the international bank’s name in the same direct 
way as a full branch, nor could it get access to cheap retail deposits from the ‘general 
public’ or the inter-bank market.  Several of the banks that applied for full licenses 
already had finance companies in Hong Kong, showing that they were not considered 
substitutes.   
 
III The Impact of the Moratorium on M&A 
One of the government’s aims behind the moratorium was consolidation and 
improvement in management and governance of local banks since foreign banks could 
only gain access by taking stakes in existing banks, thereby hopefully transferring 
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their managerial expertise.27 This goal was also consistent with attracting foreign 
interest in the emerging IFC. In practice, however, it was not easy for foreign banks to 
acquire stakes in local banks because of their ownership and governance structures. 
Even after buying an interest in a local bank, the transfer of managerial expertise and 
re-organisation could be problematic. The goal of consolidation and improvement in 
management, therefore, was not achieved by the moratorium. There was only one 
horizontal merger among existing banks when in 1973 the Overseas Trust Bank (with 
18 branches) in a period of aggressive expansion took a controlling interest in Hong 
Kong Industrial and Commercial Bank of Hong Kong (7 offices).  OTB, however, 
later proved that its governance structures were weak when it came under the attention 
of the Independent Commission against Corruption in 1986 and its officers were 
convicted of fraud dating back to 1979.28
 
The obstacles to merger included healthy profits and family ownership.  In the 1960s 
most local banks continued under the stewardship of their founder and his family.  
Figure 1 shows that profitability increased on average for banks in Hong Kong after 
the moratorium was imposed, which undermined the pressure for mergers. There is no 
sign here that the entry of 41 foreign banks in 1979 immediately affected the 
profitability of existing banks.  After the moratorium was lifted in 1981, however, 
when more comprehensive data are available, it is clear in Figure 2 that profitability 
declined. 
 
[insert Figure 1 and Figure 2 here] 
 
Figure 3 shows that there was no relationship between the size of a bank and its 
profitability.  Eliminating the relatively large Hang Seng Bank from the sample 
makes the relationship even more remote.  Small banks were not, therefore, more 
susceptible to take-over because of low profits. 
   
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
 
Some indication of the obstacles to foreign acquisition can be seen from the case of 
Barclays Bank, which made four unsuccessful attempts before asking to open a 
branch in their own name in 1971.  The main obstacles were that the principle 
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shareholders of the local bank (often the family of the founder) would not in the end 
agree to relinquish control, and that banks had inflated views of their market value 
due to the moratorium.  Thus Barclays described how one deal fell through in March 
1971 ‘because the principal shareholder could not bring himself to give us more than 
a very small interest for several years, and our ideas as to price were a long way 
apart.’ In May 1971 a team flew out from London for negotiations with another bank 
‘but it became clear that there was dissent among the shareholders as to the policy of 
bringing in outsiders’ although discussions continued to January 1972. A final attempt 
failed in November 1971 when ‘it became clear that the vendors valued their business 
at very nearly double our starting offer, and we were asked to give a yes-or-no 
decision within 24 hours.’ Paterson, then Banking Commissioner, noted that this last 
bank had carried on negotiations with no less than nine overseas banks but none of 
them successfully.29 Another of the banks approached by Barclays had been 
approached by at least five other foreign banks.30 This level of activity certainly 
suggests a healthy appetite for local Chinese banks among the international banking 
community, but the obstacles were also high. Barclays wearily concluded that ‘our 
inability to get involved with a local bank in Hong Kong has not been for want of 
trying.’31
 
Even if successfully concluded, foreign take-overs were not a reliable solution to poor 
governance, as is shown in the case of Far East Bank. This case also shows the 
intransigence of ownership and governance standards that was encouraged by the 
increased bargaining power of local banks because of the moratorium.  Deacon Chiu, 
a theatre owner in the New Territories, applied successfully for a bank license in 1959 
but by 1961 the bank was already under investigation by the Deputy Economic 
Secretary and then the Financial Secretary.32 During the Chinese New Year of 1961 
the bank was overdrawn on its clearing account at HSBC by $200,000.  After 
meeting with Chiu, Cowperthwaite noted ‘I think we will have to continue to watch 
this bank very carefully. Mr. Chiu gives his manner of thought away when he says ‘I’ 
instead of ‘the bank’. I read him a lecture about keeping banking business and other 
business strictly separate, but I am afraid the lesson will require constant repetition.’33 
In the end, the lesson was perhaps not repeated constantly enough. 
 
The Far East Bank was a victim of the 1965 banking crisis (deposits fell from 
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HK$60m in 1964 to HK$22m by the end of 1965), and was helped by the HSBC until 
a longer term solution could be found. In 1969, Citibank took a controlling interest 
(76%) of the bank leaving 24% in the control of the founder, Deacon Chiu.  Citibank 
retained control of Chiu’s share for several years, however, until he repaid debts to the 
bank.  The avidity of the American bank to take part in the Hong Kong banking 
market is evident in the terms of the acquisition, which included in Clause 11 that: 
Chiu shall continue as a Director and Chairman of the Board during his lifetime and 
City Bank agree and undertake that he shall not during his lifetime be removed 
from the position of Director and Chairman of the Board unless he shall be 
adjudicated, bankrupt, certified insane or shall be convicted of a serious offence 
which affects adversely his integrity or moral standing in the Colony of Hong 
Kong.34  
 
Citibank soon had cause to regret this concession as Chiu became dis-satisfied with 
the new management.  On 15 February 1979 the board met acrimoniously and Chiu 
and his two sons left the meeting.  Meanwhile, the remaining members of the board 
voted to hold an EGM to delete the clause that allowed Chiu to remain as Chairman.35  
Chiu subsequently took members of the Far East Bank board to court to prevent this 
and won his case since he was not dead or demonstrably insane. In 1982 Citibank 
extricated themselves from Far East Bank in an agreement by which they took over 11 
out of 25 branches of the bank, amounting to 70% of total loans and 56% total 
deposits.  In November 1988, Chiu was arrested on charges of false accounting 
dating back to 1983 and involving $210m of credit facilities to companies in Hong 
Kong and the Philippines.  The case was then delayed by appeals and judicial review 
and finally dismissed in 1993 due to Chiu’s apparent ill health.  
 
Despite this evidence of obstacles to foreign participation in local banks, the effort to 
promote consolidation was partially successful and there were a number of important 
foreign acquisitions in the late 1960s and early 1970s, mainly of medium sized banks. 
Unlike the pattern of foreign acquisitions in the 1980s these deals were not the result 
of the failure of the local bank and subsequent match-making by the banking 
commissioner. Nevertheless, governance problems persisted and two of the banks that 
attracted a foreign interest in the 1970s were under investigation for corruption by the 
ICAC by the early 1980s (Ka Wah and Overseas Trust Bank). Hong Kong Industrial 
and Commercial bank was also caught up in the 1982 crisis. As noted in the case of 
the Far East Bank, these subsequent events show that foreign acquisition was not 
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itself the solution to the problem of poor governance.  The hopes of the Financial 
Secretary that foreign banks would do the job of external supervision did not come to 
fruition. The major acquisitions of local banks are shown in Table 1, which shows that 
almost all the acquisitions were in the boom years of the early 1970s, before the 
global downturn of 1974. 
[insert Table 1 here] 
Figure 4 shows the movement in published net profits as a percent of total assets for 
some of these banks, which shows a rising trend from 1965 until 1973 close to the 
average performance of our sample of 15 banks.36  From 1973, however, by which 
time most acquisitions had taken place, almost all of the banks under-performed the 
average until the end of the decade.  This is not a full sample and is based on 
published balance sheets, which reported profits only after transfers to inner reserves.  
The outcome might also be due to more realistic balance sheet reporting after merger, 
but it does give a plausible indication that many of the banks with foreign interest 
underperformed the average after they were taken over but not before. 
[Insert Figure 4 here] 
 
The failure to learn the lessons of the 1960s is clear in the evidence that new local 
banks after the moratorium still showed the same weaknesses in the 1980s as in the 
1960s despite foreign participation. The first Hong Kong registered bank to gain a 
license after the lifting of the moratorium was the Sun Hung Kai Bank. The Sun Hung 
Kai Finance Co Ltd, a registered deposit-taking company, made the application in 
November 1981, changed its name to Sun Hung Kai Bank Ltd and started offering full 
banking services at the end of March 1982, shifting its non-banking business to a 
subsidiary.37  The major shareholders of the bank were Paribas (25%), Merrill Lynch 
(15%) and Fung King Hey, founder and chairman (42%). The bank immediately 
opened a new head office (the cost of $300m absorbed 70% of shareholders funds),38 
added two branches and moved two other branches to ground floor premises to be 
closer to retail customers.  By October 1983 the major shareholders had to make 
special deposits of HK$288m as indemnity against bad loans (the total bad loans in 
the end amounted to $339m) and the search began for an external saviour.  
Meanwhile HSBC acted as a lender of last resort and the government allowed the 
Exchange Fund to place deposits with the bank to enhance liquidity.  The agreement 
for the sale of the bank to Arab Banking Company was concluded March 1985 and 
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completed in May 1985, whereby Fung retained only 25% of the ordinary shares and 
ABC the remaining 75%. In July 1985 losses of HK$229.4m were eliminated by 
cancelling $78.1m ordinary shares and cancelling the share premium account 
$151.3m. Fung died the following month. 
 
The moratorium was not a direct cause of the governance problems of banks in Hong 
Kong, but nor was it the solution that the government had hoped it would be.  The 
cost of the failure to resolve the governance problems in the Hong Kong banking 
system was high for depositors, many of whom lost money from the bank failures of 
the 1980s, but it was also high for the government and taxpayers.  The total cost to 
the Exchange Fund related to helping seven banks during these years was HK$3.8b.39
 
IV Regulating Non-bank Financial Institutions 
Another outcome of the moratorium was an increase in non-bank finance companies, 
which did not fall into the local definition of ‘banking’ because they did not use the 
word ‘bank’ in their title, and did not serve ‘the general public’ by offering current 
account or checking accounts. This meant that they were outside the regulatory and 
supervisory purview of the Banking Ordinance and outside the Interest Rate 
Agreement.  The perverse impact of anti-competitive regulation, therefore, was an 
increase in the supply of unregulated and unsupervised financial services that further 
threatened the stability of the banking system.  Many local licensed banks 
established subsidiaries to operate in this sector. Others were formed by foreign banks 
that could not gain entry into the retail banking market. 
 
Banks became keenly aware of this competition during the boom of 1973, and in early 
July the banking members of the BAC called for regulation to restrict the activities of 
these finance companies.  The financial secretary Haddon-Cave was dismissive, 
arguing that they were not all weak or imprudent, and that the public interest rationale 
for regulation was not clearly evident.  Any legislation would have to be detailed and 
complex and he concluded that he ‘felt such a task to be beyond the present resources 
available to government.’40   This set the stage for a running battle between the 
‘official’ (government) and ‘unofficial’ (banking) members of the BAC. 
 
At the beginning of 1974 Sandberg tried to frighten Haddon-Cave into action by 
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threatening that the Interest Rate Agreement was likely to collapse because of the 
competition from DTCs. This, in turn, would mean higher interest on loans to Hong 
Kong’s industry.  Haddon-Cave didn’t take up the bait, remarking that the 
government did not have responsibility for the interest rate structure and that ‘there is 
no doubt that the IRA has worked well and it provides a useful code, though some 
would query why the price mechanism shouldn’t be allowed to determine the price of 
money as for other commodities’. On the threat of higher interest rates for industrial 
loans, he suggested that this might be a necessary evil given high interest rates 
internationally. Overall, his view was that 
‘the finance companies are now an integral part of Hong Kong’s financial sector 
and they are making a measurable contribution towards our international stature 
as a financial centre. As far as I can see, it is not within the government’s power, 
nor anyone else’s for that matter, to freeze them out.’41
 
Under continued pressure to introduce legislation to protect depositors, however, 
proposals were developed by the new Banking Commissioner, Ockendon.  He 
revealed his recommendations for a 3-tiered banking system of Full Licensed Bank, 
Limited Licensed Banks and Registered Finance Companies at the June 1974 meeting 
of the BAC.42 In essence, the proposals continued the moratorium on new retail bank 
licenses but allowed an opportunity for new banks to enter the wholesale market. 
Only the retail market for small deposits repayable within 3 months would be fully 
controlled by the existing licensed banks. They would have to compete with new 
Limited Licensed Banks for large deposits even at short term. The fully licensed 
banks, with their higher minimum capital and liquidity ratios would also compete 
directly with Registered Finance Companies for three-month deposits over $50,000.  
The proposal to reserve all deposits less than 3 months for the existing banks 
prompted ‘forceful representations’ from finance companies, which prolonged the 
introduction of the new system.43 Having established themselves in advance of any 
guidelines, the finance companies had become entrenched enough to protect their 
position. 
 
In August 1974 Haddon-Cave circulated the BAC with draft proposals for the 
Executive Council based on Ockendon’s report.  These caused considerable 
indignation and resistance among the banks. Haddon-Cave’s draft was particularly 
critical of the anti-competitive impact of the moratorium, noting that restrictions had 
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been imposed at a time of weakness, but  
‘now, the banking system is strong and healthy and less in need of protection in 
return for the obligations imposed on it. In principle, protection from competition 
discourages innovation by those protected and keeps charges unnecessarily high, 
while its more beneficial effects may become eroded by the diversion of regulated 
business into unregulated channels.’44
 
The banking members of the BAC objected, claiming perversely that Hong Kong’s 
reputation could be impaired by a rapid expansion in the number of banks that the 
government had responsibility to supervise.  They claimed there was strong and 
healthy competition and ‘it is unappropriate [sic] and demeaning to use a loaded 
expression such as ‘protection from competition….’.45
 
The draft memo went on to conclude that there were probably enough retail banks, but 
there was room for entry in the wholesale sector. The unofficial members of the BAC 
responded that the banks had already seen an erosion of their ability to attract funds 
because of the competition from DTCs not subject to the same restrictions as the 
banks were (liquidity margins and reporting requirements). The problem, therefore, 
was not the entry of new banks (who would be subject to the same restrictions as 
existing banks) but the operation of non-bank institutions outside the regulations that 
were competing with banks for short term deposits. 
 
The memo set out a choice between control and supervision of DTCs to protect 
depositors and preserve the stability of the financial system or to impose liquidity 
requirements and other controls to protect banks from competition. The memo then 
rejected the second option since ‘such control and supervision would require an army 
of inspectors and could never be fully effective’.  Instead, it recommended the three 
tiered system of full license banks, limited licensed banks, and registered finance 
companies.   
 
At the September 1974 meeting of the BAC to discuss the draft for the ExCo, no 
agreement could be achieved.  The government’s view was that the bankers’ 
proposals for minimum deposits for DTCs ‘would be harmful to the present condition 
of our financial sector as well as being unacceptable to those operating in our markets 
at present (including those of international repute).’46 The government was not willing 
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to close down these institutions through regulation. However, the Financial Secretary 
still sought a compromise and was eventually ready to accept the banks’ request for 
registration of DTCs, and minimum paid up capital but with lower minimum deposit 
requirements. The proposals for limited licensed banks (i.e. new competition for short 
term deposits) could be shelved for the moment. 
 
Finally, in November 1974, noting that after informal discussion between official and 
unofficial members of the BAC since September, ‘official members now accept that 
present conditions are unsuitable for a radical reshaping of Hong Kong’s financial 
sector’, the Banking Commissioner submitted the compromise proposals for the 
Executive Council.47
1. The proposals for issue of limited banking licences and consequent redefinition of 
banking business would be left under review. 
2. No further bank licenses would be issued until more settled finance conditions 
prevailed and until better information was available on the scale of operations of 
finance companies. 
3. Some measures to protect smaller depositors will be implemented. 
 
Only banks could accept deposits less than $50,000, all DTCs would have to register 
and all must after 2 years have minimum capital of $5m ($2.5m paid up), provide 
annual audited accounts available for inspection by the public and displayed at the 
place of business, and they would pay an annual fee to cover administration of the 
new rules.  The Banking Commissioner reserved the right to call for further 
information to check compliance.  DTCs were also prevented from lending more 
than 25% of paid up capital and reserves to any one person or company, and they had 
the same requirements as banks over lending to directors and relatives. The proposals 
were duly put to the Executive Council and then to the Legislative Council in January 
1975. 
  The banks lost their battles over the minimum size of deposit, and minimum 
duration, which were much lower than they had wished. What had seemed at the 
outset to be a simple matter of protection of depositors in July 1973 grew into a 
prolonged and bitter battle between Haddon-Cave and the banks over the protection of 
the banking market in Hong Kong. It took 18 months for agreement in principal to be 
achieved and a further year for the bill to become law in January 1976 when 176 
DTCs were registered.  Prudential supervision of DTCs was enhanced at the end 
1978 by requiring monthly returns, just after a run on Sun Hung Kai Finance Co. in 
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November of that year required lines of credit from HSBC and Paribas.48 The 
implementation of physical inspections, however, was delayed by recruitment and 
training of staff and did not begin until January 1980.  By June 1980 the Banking 
Commissioner Colin Martin warned that he had no discretion over who successfully 
registered a DTC so long as they complied with the basic legal requirements, and so it 
was up to customers to assure themselves of the quality of the DTCs they did business 
with.49.  The Three-Tiered System was finally introduced in 1981, seven years after 
it was first proposed and a prolonged banking crisis began in 1982. 
 
V  Restrictions on Expanding Branch Networks 
The anti-competitive regulations introduced in the mid-1960s went further than most 
international financial centres, but they did not satisfy the desire of local banks for 
protection from non-bank financial institutions as was revealed in the previous section.  
The desire to gain protection from foreign banks already operating in the colony 
before the imposition of the moratorium was a third avenue for local banks to lobby 
the government for protection.  After price competition was curtailed by the controls 
on deposit interest, banks had to rely on non-price competition to get access to funds, 
such as the provision of other services (safety deposit, foreign exchange), location, 
convenience, personal service, and reputation. The high profile of local branching 
activity in the discussions among banks suggests that this was an important form of 
competition both to attract local deposits and to gain local lending opportunities. A 
bank that could not develop a branch network had to rely on the more expensive 
inter-bank market to get funds, or take on exchange risk by transferring funds into the 
colony. Figure 5 shows the most rapid growth in branch activity in Hong Kong in the 
first half of the 1960s and again in the early 1970s. 
[insert Figure 5] 
The rapid expansion of branch networks was a common feature at this time. The 
OECD reported that ‘practically all countries have seen a spectacular extension of the 
banking network in the sixties and seventies either though branching by existing 
banks or, in some countries, also by the setting up of new banks.’  Moreover, ‘a 
striking feature of this early phase of private customer acquisition was that price 
competition was hardly used as this was considered by the banks as too costly and 
inefficient and was moreover in conflict with current banking practice and official 
restrictions on deposit rates applying at that time in most countries’.50 The most 
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notable example was the proliferation of branches in the USA while Regulation Q (a 
ceiling on deposit interest payable) was in force.  Hong Kong’s development thus 
reflected global trends in banking as well as local factors. 
 
Locally, demographic change was an added factor encouraging the increase in branch 
networks. As the large refugee population was resettled into new state housing in 
purpose-built sites, this increased the opportunities for new branches.  In 1963, for 
example, the Chartered Bank applied to the Government to open a ‘Squatter Bank’ in 
the temporary squatter area of Wan Tai Sin ‘realising that many of the squatters were 
far from penniless’.51  
 
The increase in the number of branches prompted calls to restrict this form of 
competition, particularly by foreign banks.  The case for new rules was based on a 
variety of premises. First, the government worried that opening branches was costly 
and could undermine the solvency of small banks that expanded too quickly.  
Secondly, local banks were hostile to competition from foreign banks operating in 
Hong Kong, some of whom were becoming increasingly competitive in the local retail 
market. Thirdly, large local banks frequently faced barriers to entry in overseas 
markets and sought reciprocity as a lever to overcome these obstacles. 
 
By 1965 there were 29 foreign banks operating in Hong Kong (excluding HSBC, 
which was registered locally). These included a group of overseas Chinese banks from 
Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia that specialised in regional trade finance. They 
tended not to open branches to participate in the local credit market.  The European 
and American banks, however, did branch extensively after 1959. Chartered Bank had 
the largest network (17 branches by 1965) followed by Banque Belge pour l’Etranger 
with five branches in 1965.  HSBC complained particularly about American bankers 
as ‘fierce competitors who keep to no rules, and surely it is good policy to make 
things as expensive and as difficult for them as possible.’52  In 1964 Jake Saunders, 
chief manager of HSBC, observed of American banks that ‘I am afraid there is no 
doubt that they want to dominate the financial scene in South-East Asia’.53   
 
As shown in Figure 5 there was a surge of branching activity in the years running up 
to the introduction of the moratorium in 1965, but most of this was local bank 
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expansion.  In total, the number of bank branches increased from 38 to 101 in 1961 
alone, but only 5 of these were branches of foreign banks.  By 1970, however, 
foreign banks had increased their share of total branches from 8% to 13%.  Table 2 
shows the networks for different categories of bank in Hong Kong during the second 
surge in the number of branches between 1970 and 1973. This shows the rapid 
expansion of foreign banks compared to local or note-issuing banks (although they 
increased their share of total branches only from 13% to 16%). The most prominent 
foreign banks were Citibank with 6 branches in 1970, followed by Banque Belge pour 
l’Etranger, Banque Nationale de Paris and International Bank of Commerce (a 
US-owned bank) with four branches each. Citibank became a very aggressive player 
in the domestic system, opening 43 branches by 1981. In 1970 the two banks with by 
far the most extensive networks were the note-issuing banks HSBC (62) and 
Chartered Bank (25), both of whom lobbied vigorously for restrictions on other banks 
extending their networks. 
[insert Table 2 here] 
In 1966 (exactly one year after the moratorium on new bank licences had been 
imposed), the HSBC complained to the Financial Secretary that applications to open 
branches in San Francisco and Singapore and been refused on the grounds that local 
authorities there believed the area was already adequately supplied with banking 
services.54  HSBC hoped that the government would retaliate by restricting the 
branching of banks from these countries. Carruthers of HSBC wrote to 
Cowperthwaite, the Financial Secretary: ‘we feel very strongly that you should seek 
authority to prohibit those foreign banks whose country or state imposes restrictions 
on branches of foreign banks from opening further branches in the colony’.55  The 
HSBC’s motive, therefore, was clearly defensive and related to their international 
expansion.   
 
Cowperthwaite replied that he had been considering developing powers for the 
Banking Commissioner to control branching, but his motives did not match those of 
the HSBC.  As he explained to Carruthers: ‘The clause is primarily intended to give 
the government power to control to some extent the extension of the activities of 
banks which are known to be over-stretched or otherwise operating in ways contrary 
to the interest of the community though as a matter of general policy it could be used 
to prevent branch openings for other valid reasons.’ He explicitly rejected the 
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possibility of using such powers to restrict branches in areas that were over-banked, 
‘as this is contrary to our normal philosophy here of freedom to compete’.56  The 
concern that banks might over-extend themselves arose from the case of the Far East 
Bank, which had an unusually large branch network for a local bank (13 branches) but 
suffered during the 1965 banking crisis from a loss of deposits and had to be nursed 
by the HSBC. 
 
At the September 1966 Banking Advisory Committee meeting, the Financial 
Secretary conceded that the issue of reciprocity would be considered when new 
branches were authorised.  In turn, the members of the BAC agreed on three 
conditions for branch expansion by local banks: an assessment of whether the new 
branch would over-extending its resources was a ‘prime consideration’.  Secondarily, 
the competitive position in the proposed locale ‘might be’ taken into account.57
 
The Banking Ordinance was duly amended in 1967 to require banks to obtain 
approval from the Banking Commissioner to open new branches and introducing a 
$1000 fee (hardly prohibitive even for the smallest bank). Debate continued, however, 
over the criteria under which the authority to open a new branch should be given.  
The Far Eastern Economic Review reported that some foreign banks were refused 
permission to open branches in 1968, although this decision had been reversed in the 
case of National City Bank due to the long time the bank had been represented in 
Hong Kong.58  In 1968 the only foreign banks to open branches (and the number) 
were the Chartered Bank (3), National City Bank (2) and Banque de l’Indochine (1). 
In addition, local banks opened 11 branches altogether (of which 5 were HSBC). 
 
The banks’ motivation for restricting branch expansion was clearly aimed at 
restricting competition from foreign banks rather than concern for the banking system 
as a whole, and they found an ally in the Banking Commissioner, Leo Cole.  Cole 
was vitriolic in his condemnation of foreign banks in the Colony.  He described them 
to HSBC chief manager J.H. Saunders in May 1968 as ‘parasitic invasions’ that  
contribute little or nothing in the way of support and assistance to the colony and  
they bring very little in. They perform no function within the colony which cannot 
be adequately fulfilled by the colony’s own banks, apart from representation.59
 
The charge of parasitic behaviour is difficult to substantiate.  Excluding the 
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note-issuing banks (which were not included in Cole’s definition of ‘foreign’) the 
ratio of local advances to local deposits for foreign banks was 115% in 1968, 
implying a net inflow of funds from abroad rather than a drain.  This ratio was also 
twice as high as the local banks (56%).  On the other hand, Mainland banks 
controlled by the Bank of China took in deposits but did not lending locally. Their 
ratio of advances to deposits was a mere 39% because they channelled their liquidity 
across the border to the Mainland.  While the Mainland Chinese banks were mostly 
foreign registered, they were never specifically mentioned in the debate over 
competition.  The focus was squarely on American and European banks. More 
telling is the second sentence of this quotation, which refers to the competition posed 
by foreign banks.  
 
Table 3 shows the distribution of deposits and advances for different categories of 
bank. Competition for deposits for local banks in the mid-1960s was coming from the 
note-issuing banks (in particular the HSBC and Chartered Bank) and not from the 
foreign banks. But the note-issuing banks were the instigators of anti-competitive 
regulation, not the target of the lobbying. On the other hand, foreign banks were 
collectively increasing their share of advances. 
[insert Table 3 here] 
In April 1968, three years into the operation of the moratorium on new licenses, 24 
local banks wrote to the Banking Commissioner, Leo Cole, to urge further controls on 
branch expansion, appealing to the dangers to stability: ‘Hong Kong already has too 
many banks, and as a result of severe competition, customers have been, and are, 
offered large amounts of banking facilities, thus encouraging unhealthy 
overtrading’.60 At the same time, Lee Wing Heng, Sub-Manager of Hang Seng Bank 
complained that deposits had been rising but that there were few outlets for lending.61 
At a Banking Advisory Committee meeting in June 1968, QW Lee as manager of 
Hang Seng went so far as to call for all local Hong Kong business to be restricted to 
local Hong Kong banks.  Chau Kai-Yin, on behalf of all the authorised local banks, 
agreed that foreign banks were ‘interfering with domestic banking’ and threatening 
local banks’ business.62  Cowperthwaite continued to resist extra restrictions foreign 
banks, arguing that smaller local banks were feeling the pinch from large local banks 
as well as large foreign banks.  Cole responded that the large local banks could offer 
support to smaller banks in time of need, whereas the foreign banks did not and so 
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they should be treated less generously.   
 
After much debate, the BAC put three views to the Governor in Council to restrict 
further the local activity of foreign banks.63
1. The majority of bank members and Leo Cole recommended that foreign banks 
already in Hong Kong should be entitled to one office in Hong Kong and one 
in Kowloon. They should be allowed to branch elsewhere only provided they 
could demonstrate a need, local banks would not be affected and that the 
principle of reciprocity held.  
2. The Financial Secretary, Mardulyn (Banque Belge pour l’Etranger) and the 
Registrar General preferred no restrictions on branches once a foreign bank had 
been allowed into Hong Kong. As a compromise (if this was not acceptable) 
foreign banks should be allowed to branch freely in the main business areas but 
not where banking was largely domestic. 
3. Francis Zimmern, a prominent businessman, argued that all banks applying to 
open a branch should have to justify need and ability to sustain it, making the 
policy non-discriminatory. 
 
At this point there were applications from three foreign banks to open simultaneously 
a total of 12 new branches outside the Central business district of Hong Kong.64 At the 
beginning of 1969 all applications for new bank branches were held in suspense while 
a general policy was devised.65 The Governor, perhaps surprisingly given the weight 
of opinion in the BAC, opted to accept Zimmern’s suggestion and avoid 
discriminating between foreign and local banks.  The criteria for new branches of all 
banks were to be the resources of the bank and the need to avoid an excess of banking 
facilities in any particular area.66 There was no guidance, however, on how ‘an excess 
of banking facilities’ was to be determined.  The principal of reciprocity had already 
been agreed as a further informal criterion. This rubric was evidently not effectively 
binding since the number of bank offices increased from 274 at the end of 1968 to 326 
by the end of 1970 (an increase of 19%). In 1969 alone five foreign banks opened new 
branches.   
 
This section has shown how the moratorium on new bank licenses and the interest rate 
agreement together were deemed insufficient protection from competitive pressures 
because they encouraged non-price competition in the form of branch networks.  The 
banks found support from the Banking Commissioner but not from the Financial 
Secretary or the Governor who remained focused on systemic stability as a rationale 
for regulation, which ruled out discrimination against foreign banks. The data show 
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that competition from the note-issuing banks was much more keen than the 
competition from other foreign banks, and that foreign banks were not a net drain on 
the colony as was claimed.  However, the note-issuing banks used the support of the 
local banks to press for further protection from foreign competition.  In the end, 
without the support of the Financial Secretary, the banks were not able to restrict 
existing foreign banks’ access to the domestic market through branch expansion.   
 
VI  Conclusions 
During the 1960s and 1970s many governments restricted foreign bank entry and 
imposed capital controls in order to protect incumbents and insulate their banking 
systems from international instability.  This offered opportunities for more open IFCs 
like London and Hong Kong to take advantage of the rapid escalation in international 
financial and banking activity. Nevertheless, even in a ‘laissez-faire’ regime such as 
Hong Kong the tension between hosting an international financial centre and 
protecting incumbents led to ongoing conflict between banks and the government. 
The presence of foreign banks in Hong Kong was a hotly contested issue in the 1960s 
and 1970s as Hong Kong’s IFC developed.  In the case of restrictions on branches, 
the local banks lost the battle for further protection from foreign banks’ activities but 
they did gain considerable protection through the strict operation of the moratorium 
on new licences, which they were able to influence administratively through the 
Banking Advisory Committee.  Even once the rules were changed to allow some 
foreign banks to enter to build up the IFC, they granted only one new license.  On 
the other hand, the government’s reluctance to regulate deposit-taking companies 
reflected the Financial Secretary’s efforts to promote wholesale banking while 
protecting local banks’ retail operations. 
 
The fact that there was no banking crisis until after the moratorium was finally lifted 
in 1981 might suggest that the moratorium did work to improve the stability of the 
banking system. The account based on archival evidence presented in this paper, 
however, suggests that the moratorium failed in many of its goals, particularly the 
improvement of governance.  The main results were increased non-price competition, 
increased profits, and a rise of institutions outside prudential supervision. The 
problems of poor governance that had plagued the banking system in the early 1960s 
continued. Many of the banks involved in the scandals that led to the crisis of 1982-86 
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had foreign partners but this did not resolve their governance problems and they 
continued to be controlled by families with inter-linking business groups.67  This left 
the banking system vulnerable to contagion from unsupervised non-banks as well as 
to asset market shocks, particularly property values that were a precipitating factor in 
the 1982-86 crises.   
 
While the banks (both large and small) lobbied for the moratorium for 
anti-competitive reasons, the government supported it in order to encourage foreign 
banks to do the job that prudential supervision and regulation was meant to do, i.e. 
improve management and governance.  However, the protection afforded to small 
banks by the moratorium and the interest rate cartel worked against this outcome.  
Higher profits and greater franchise value improved the bargaining power of local 
banks and reduced the incentive for horizontal mergers. At the same time the 
moratorium reduced the regulatory space by prompting the rise of non-bank financial 
institutions that ultimately threatened systemic stability through their links to banks 
and through contagion. The fact that owners of banks did not themselves view DTCs 
as a substitute for fully licensed banks, and that once the moratorium was lifted the 
market share of DTCs dropped away suggests that if the moratorium had not been in 
place there would have been more banks within the supervisory realm of the 
government.  The moratorium therefore did not achieve its goal of solving the 
underlying weaknesses of governance in the Hong Kong banking system that 
resurfaced in the crises of 1982-1986.  
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Figure 1 
Return on Assets for a Sample of 15 Hong Kong Banks 1964-1980
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Source: Published balance sheets for 13 banks.1 Chartered Bank archives, Guildhall 
Library. King (1991) for HSBC. 
 
 
Figure 2 
Return on Assets of Licensed Banks in Hong Kong (income-costs/assets)
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Source: Census of Storage, Communications, Financing, Insurance and Business 
Services, Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong. 
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Figure 3 
Size of total assets and net earnings/net worth: 1977
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Source: SGV-Sun Hung Kai Ltd., A Study of Domestic Commercial Banks in Hong 
Kong, December 31, 1978. 
 
Figure 4 
Comparison of Average Profits for 15 Hong Kong Banks and 7 Banks with Foreign Participation
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Figure 5 
Expansion of Bank Offices in Hong Kong 1954-1980
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Source: HKIMR Historical Database https://www.hkimr.org/history_database.asp 
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Table 1  Foreign Interest in Hong Kong Banks 1969-79 
Parent Majority Interest Minority Interest 
First National City Far East Bank (1969)  
National and Grindlays Dao Heng (1970)  
Hawaii Thrift and Loan Co. Ka Wah (1970)  
CS Low Investment Ltd Ka Wah (1974)  
Security Pacific National Bank Bank of Canton (1971)  
International Consolidated 
Investments Ltd (Toronto 
Dominion Bank) 
Overseas Trust Bank (1970)  
International Consolidated 
Investments Ltd/ Toronto 
Dominion Bank 
Hong Kong Industrial and 
Commercial Bank (1970) 
 
Irving Trust Wing Hang (1973)  
Fuji Bank Kwong On Bank (1973)  
BCCI Hong Kong Metropolitan (1979)  
Swiss Bank Corp Hong Kong Metropolitan (1974)  
Tokai Bank  Commercial Bank of 
Hong Kong (1972) 
Bangkok Bank  Commercial Bank of 
Hong Kong (1966) 
Chartered Bank  Wing Lung Bank (1973) 
Wells Fargo  Shanghai Commercial 
Bank (1969) 
Mitsubishi Bank  Liu Chong Hing Bank 
(1973) 
Daiiichi Kangyo Bank  Chekiang First Bank 
(1962) 
 
Table 2   Branch Networks – totals exclude head office 
 1970 1973 Percent Change
Foreign 39 64 64
Local 116 168 36
Note Issuing 89 111 25
Mainland Chinese 45 61 36
TOTAL 289 404 40
Note: note-issuing banks are HSBC, Chartered Bank and Mercantile Bank 
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Table 3   Share of Total Deposits and Advances of the Banking System (Percent) 
 Share of 
Deposits 
1964 
Share of 
Deposits 
1968 
Share of 
Deposits 
1972 
Share of 
Advances 
1964 
Share of 
Advances 
1968 
Share of 
Advances 
1972 
Foreign 
Banks 
16 12 13 22 25 30 
Local 
Banks 
34 31 35 35 30 32 
Note 
Issuing 
Banks 
40 45 44 36 38 33 
Mainland 
Chinese 
Banks 
10 11 8 7 7 5 
Source: HKRS 163-1-3273, 163-1-3277, 163/9/371 
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